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Interactions among living organisms, from bacteria colonies to human societies, are inherently more com-
plex than interactions among particles and nonliving matter. Group interactions are a particularly important and
widespread class, representative of which is the public goods game. In addition, methods of statistical physics
have proven valuable for studying pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organisation in evolution-
ary games. Here we review recent advances in the study of evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on
structured populations, including lattices, complex networks and coevolutionary models. We also compare
these results with those obtained on well-mixed populations. The review particularly highlights that the study
of the dynamics of group interactions, like several other important equilibrium and non-equilibrium dynamical
processes in biological, economical and social sciences, benefits from the synergy between statistical physics,
network science and evolutionary game theory.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s, 89.75.-k
Keywords: evolution, cooperation, public goods, phase transitions, pattern formation, cyclical interactions, self-organization,
lattices, complex networks, coevolution, statistical physics
1. INTRODUCTION
We present a review of recent advances on the evolutionary
dynamics of spatial games that are governed by group interac-
tions. The focus is on the public goods game, or more gener-
ally N -player games, which are representative for this type of
interaction. Although relevant aspects of 2-player games are
surveyed as well, we refer to [1] for a more thorough exposi-
tion. Another important aspect of this review is its focus on
structured populations. In the continuation of this introduc-
tory section we will also summarise basic results concerning
the public goods game on well-mixed populations, but we re-
fer the reader to [2, 3] for details.
The methodological perspective that permeates throughout
the review is that of statistical physics. The advances re-
viewed therefore ought to be of interest to physicists that are
involved in the interdisciplinary research of complex systems,
but hopefully also to experts on game theory, sociology, com-
puter science, ecology, as well as evolution and modeling of
socio-technical systems in general. Group interactions are in-
deed inseparably linked with our increasingly interconnected
world, and thus lie at the interface of many different fields of
research. We note that there are many studies which are not
covered in this review. However, we have tried to make it as
comprehensive as possible to facilitate further research.
We describe our motivation, notation, and other elementary
concepts in subsection 1.1, followed by “in a nutshell” survey
of results on well-mixed populations in subsection 1.2, and an
overview of the organisation of the review in subsection 1.3.
∗Electronic address: matjaz.perc@uni-mb.si
1.1. Motivation and basic concepts
Given that fundamental interactions of matter are of pair-
wise nature, the consideration of N -particle interactions in
traditional physical systems is relatively rare. In computa-
tional approaches aimed at modeling social, economical and
biological systems, however, where the constituents are nei-
ther point mass particles nor magnetic moments,N -player in-
teractions are almost as fundamental as 2-player interactions.
Most importantly, group interactions in general cannot be re-
duced to the corresponding sum of pairwise interactions.
A simple model inspired by experiments [4–10] can be in-
voked for both motivating the usage of the public goods game
as well as for introducing basic notation. Consider a colony
of N microbial agents where a fraction of them (producers
or cooperators) pour amounts of a fast diffusive chemical into
the environment. The latter has the status of a public good as
it is beneficial also for those that do not produce it (free-riders
or defectors). For N = 3 such a setup is depicted schemat-
ically in Fig. 1. The metabolic expenses stemming from the
production cost of the public good are given by the cost func-
tion α(ρC), while the individual benefit for each of the N
microbes is β(ρC), where 0 ≤ ρC ≤ 1 is the fraction of
producers. Each non-producing (D-phenotype) microbe thus
receives the payoff PD = β(ρC), while each microbe that
does produce (C-phenotype) bears the additional cost, so that
its net benefit is PC = β(ρC)− α(ρC).
For N = 2 and the simple choice of α(ρC) = c/(2ρC) and
β(ρC) = bθ(ρC) [where θ(x) is the step function], we recover
two well-known games that are governed by pairwise interac-
tions. Namely the prisoner’s dilemma for 2b > c > b > 0 and
the snowdrift game for b > c > 0, as summarized in Table I.
When N ≥ 3, however, the problem becomes that of group
2C
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FIG. 1: Schematic configuration of N = 3 microbes, where a frac-
tion ρC = 2/3 are cooperators (producers) and ρD = 1/3 are de-
fectors (free-riders). For the most popular choice of benefit and cost
functions, β(ρC) = rρC (r > 1) and α(ρC) = 1 respectively, in-
dividual payoffs are PC(2/3) = 2r/3 − 1 and PD(2/3) = 2r/3.
An explicit computation of PC(ρC) (1/3 ≤ ρC ≤ 1) and PD(ρC)
(0 ≤ ρC ≤ 2/3) reveals that they cannot be generated by means of
pairwise interactions, thus illustrating the inherent irreducibility of
group interactions.
interactions. We see that, under the sensible assumption of
additivity of individually obtained payoffs, the defined payoff
structure cannot be reproduced by means of pairwise interac-
tions (see caption of Fig. 1 for details). This example also
suggests that, provided the benefit and cost functions could be
inferred from experiments, the experimenter could potentially
determine whether a colony is governed by pair or group inter-
actions. Indeed, it was recently noted [3] that the oversimpli-
fying restriction of pairwise social interactions has dominated
the interpretation of many biological data that would likely be
much better interpreted in terms of group interactions.
The payoffs PD = β(ρC) and PC = β(ρC)− α(ρC) have
a general public goods game structure in that cooperators bare
an additional cost besides the benefits that are common to both
strategies. The analysis of decision making by a “rational mi-
crobe” thus falls within the realm of classical game theory. In
this framework, for a constant individual production cost α
and an arbitrary concave benefit function β(ρC), Motro [11]
showed that even values from within the 0 < ρC < 1 in-
terval are stable Nash equilibria. Under certain conditions to
be met by the benefit and cost functions (β and α), there is
thus no “tragedy of the commons” [12]. This may be wel-
comed news for the liberal (“invisible hand”) supporters of
public goods systems: The tragedy of the commons is ratio-
nally avoidable even without the “cognitive” or “normative”
capacities required for the existence of additional strategies.
Nevertheless, the “tragedy of the commons” does occur in the
majority of other cases (e.g., linear benefit function β), where
no production of the public good is the only rational individual
choice.
1.2. Evolutionary game dynamics
Turning back to microbial populations, under the assump-
tion that the reproductive power of each microbe is propor-
tional to the net metabolic benefit enjoyed, one arrives at a
formal description for the time evolution of the fraction of
C D
C R = b− (c/2) S = b− c
D T = b P = 0
TABLE I: Payoff matrix of 2-player games if α = c/(2ρC) and
β = θ(ρC)b. For 2b > c > b > 0 we have the prisoner’s dilemma,
and for b > c > 0 the snowdrift game.
producers ρC . This is the realm of evolutionary game dynam-
ics, which implements Darwinian natural selection of pheno-
types in populations under frequency-dependent fitness con-
ditions [1, 2, 13, 14], as well as in related though non-genetic
social and economic systems. In the latter, “social learning”
assumptions may lead to a very similar evolutionary dynamics
provided simple assumptions concerning the cognitive capa-
bilities of agents are accepted.
A calculation that invokes a standard well-mixed popula-
tion setting (see below and [3, 15, 16]) leads to the differential
equation for the expected value x = 〈ρC〉 of the fraction of
producers
x˙ = x(1− x)[WC(x) −WD(x)] , (1)
where WC,D(x) is the average payoff per either a cooperative
or defective individual. This is the replicator equation, which
is nonlinear already for linear payoffs. Depending further on
the additional properties of α(x) and β(x), its analysis may
thus be all but straightforward.
Theorems relate the asymptotic states of the replicator
equation with Nash’s stability criteria, and Motro’s [11] re-
sults on the public goods game in turn translate into the char-
acterization of the evolutionary stable states for our microbial
population. In particular, for constant α and concave bene-
fit functions β(x), a well-mixed colony of mixed phenotypic
composition is evolutionary stable. Notably, in addition to
the replicator dynamics, best-response and related learning
dynamics can also be formulated for the evolution of x, and
indeed they can be of much relevance in specific contexts of
agent based modeling.
At this point, it is informative to spell out the operational as-
sumptions that traditionally underlie the well-mixed approxi-
mation [3]. In particular, it is assumed that the N − 1 individ-
uals that interact with the focal player are randomly sampled
from an infinite population of cooperators and defectors, so
that the probability of interacting with j cooperators is given
by fj(x) = CN−1j xj(1 − x)N−1−j , where x (1 − x) is the
average fraction of cooperators (defectors). Other formally
more sophisticated settings can also be of interest. We refer to
[16] for one that allows to consider a continuum of strategies
parameterized by the amount of public good produced per in-
dividual, and to [17] for a “grand canonical” treatment where
the group size N is considered a random variable.
Note that the payoffs of the focal individual are collected
from group configurations that are statistically uncorrelated.
Moreover, in order to implement the assumption that the indi-
vidual reproductive power is proportional to the net benefits,
while operationally keeping a constant population size N , one
3can (among other options, like using the stochastic birth/death
Moran process) use a replicator-like rule in which, in the next
time step, the focal player imitates the current strategy of a
randomly chosen agent from the group, with a probability de-
pending on the payoff difference. It is worth emphasising that
the basic underlying assumption here is homogeneity, so that
individuals do not differentiate or assort, as both (i) the pay-
off’s are collected from, and (ii) the competitive reproduction
is against configurations sampled from an unbiased (uncorre-
lated) strategic distribution fj(x).
If departing from the assumptions of well-mixed popula-
tions, however, several issues open up. To begin with:
• Which criterion determines how group configurations
are sampled to provide instantaneous payoff to focal
players? Is the group size N also a random variable
in that sampling?
• What kind of population sampling is used to implement
replicating competition among strategies? In other
words, who imitates whom? Should members of all
groups be potential imitators (or should potentially be
imitated)? Or should just a fraction of them (for exam-
ple those in a smaller spatial neighborhood of the focal
player) qualify as such?
There are several possible answers to both groups of ques-
tions, and they depend significantly on the particular prob-
lem one wishes to address. For example, for a quantitative
modeling of a yeast colony of invertase-producers and non-
producing cells, the answers should be based on considera-
tions involving characteristic time scales of many biochemical
processes and the spatial microbial arrangements that are typ-
ical amongst the measured samples of the microbial colony,
to name but a few potentially important issues. On the other
hand, in systems where best-response or other non-imitative
evolutionary rules are considered, only the first group of ques-
tions would likely be of relevance.
Recent research concerning public goods games on struc-
tured populations is in general very indirectly, if at all, re-
lated to a particular experimental setup. Instead, it is of an
exploratory nature over different potentially relevant theoret-
ical issues that can be either formulated or understood as lat-
tice or network effects. A quite common ground motivation
is the search for analogs of network reciprocity [18]. Is the
resilience of cooperative clusters against invading defectors
on networks and lattices enough to effectively work against
the mean-field tendencies [19]? More generally, what are
the effects of structure in a population when confluent with
known sources of public goods sustainability, such as punish-
ment or reward? Are these synergistic confluences? Indeed,
the interest of reviewed research goes far beyond its relevance
to a specific experiment. Evolutionary game dynamics is of
fundamental interest to the making of interdisciplinary com-
plex systems science, encompassing biological, economical
as well as social sciences, and from this wider perspective,
the universal features of dynamical processes of group inter-
actions are still rather unexplored.
1.3. Organisation of the review
The remainder of this review is organised as follows. In
Sec. 2 we survey the implementation of the public goods game
on lattices. We focus on recent studies investigating the ef-
fects of lattice structure on the emergence of cooperation. In
addition, we review both the effects of heterogeneity in the dy-
namical ingredients of the public goods game as well as the ef-
fects of strategic complexity on the evolution of cooperation.
In Sec. 3 we focus on structures that are more representative
for human societies. In this framework we will revisit the for-
mulation of the public goods game on complex networks and
show how social diversity promotes cooperation. In addition,
we will survey how public goods games on networks can be
formulated by means of a bipartite representation. The latter
includes both social as well as group structure, thus opening
the path towards a more accurate study of group interactions
in large social systems. We conclude Sec. 3 by reviewing dif-
ferent networked structures in which the public goods game
has been implemented, most notably modular and multiplex
networks, as well as populations of mobile agents. In Sec. 4
we review advances on structured populations where the con-
nections coevolve with the evolutionary dynamics, and where
thus the topology of interactions changes depending on the
payoffs and strategies in the population. We round off the
review by discussing the main perspectives, challenges and
open questions in Sec. 5, and by summarising the conclusions
in Sec. 6.
2. LATTICES
Beyond patch-structured populations where under certain
updating rules the spatial structure has no effect on the evolu-
tion of altruism [21–23], lattices represent very simple topolo-
gies, which enjoy remarkable popularity in game theoretical
models [18, 24, 25]. Despite their dissimilarity to actual so-
cial networks [26], they provide a very useful entry point for
exploring the consequences of structure on the evolution of
cooperation. Moreover, there are also realistic systems, espe-
cially in biology and ecology, where the competition between
the species can be represented adequately by means of a lat-
tice [27, 28]. In general, lattices can be regarded as an even
field for all competing strategies where the possibility of net-
work reciprocity is given [18]. Furthermore, as there are many
different types of lattices (see Fig. 2 for details), we can focus
on very specific properties of group interactions and test what
is their role in the evolutionary process.
The basic setup for a public goods game with cooperators
and defectors as the two competing strategies on a lattice can
be described as follows. Initially, N ∝ L2 players are ar-
ranged into overlapping groups of size G such that everyone is
surrounded by its k = G− 1 neighbors and belongs to g = G
different groups, where L is the linear system size and k the
degree (or coordination number) of the lattice. Each player
on site i is designated either as a cooperator (C) si = 1 or
defector (D) si = 0 with equal probability. Cooperators con-
tribute a fixed amount a, normally considered being equal to
4(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIG. 2: Schematic presentation of different types of lattices. On
the square lattice (a) each player has four immediate neighbors, thus
forming groups of size G = 5, while on the honeycomb lattice (b) it
has three, thus G = 4. In both cases the clustering coefficient C is
zero. Yet the membership of unconnected players in the same groups
introduces effective links between them, which may evoke behavior
that is characteristic for lattices with closed triplets [20]. On the
other hand, the kagome´ (c) and the triangular lattice (d) both feature
percolating overlapping triangles, which makes them less susceptible
to effects introduced by group interactions. The kagome´ lattice has
G = 5 and C = 1/3, while the triangular lattice has C = 2/5 and
G = 7.
1 without loss of generality, to the common pool while defec-
tors contribute nothing. Finally, the sum of all contributions
in each group is multiplied by the synergy factor r and the
resulting public goods are distributed equally amongst all the
group members. The payoff of player i in every group g is
P gi = r
∑
j∈g sja
G
− sia = r
NgCa
G
− sia , (2)
where NgC is the number of cooperators in group g. The net
payoff i thereby acquires is the sum of the payoffs received in
all the groups it participates in: Pi =
∑
g P
g
i .
The microscopic dynamics involves the following elemen-
tary steps. First, a randomly selected player i plays the public
goods game as a member of all the g = 1, . . . , G groups.
Next, player i chooses one of its neighbors at random, and the
chosen player j also acquires its payoff Pj in the same way.
Finally, player i enforces its strategy si onto player j with
some probability determined by their payoff difference. One
of the possible choices for this update probability is the Fermi
function,
Π(si → sj) =
1
1 + exp[(Pj − Pi)/GK]
, (3)
where K quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions and
G normalises it with respect to the number and size of the
groups. These elementary steps are repeated consecutively,
whereby each full Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance
for every player to enforce its strategy onto one of the neigh-
bors once on average. Alternatively, synchronous updating
can also be applied so that all the players play and update
their strategies simultaneously, but the latter can lead to spuri-
ous results, especially in the deterministic K → 0 limit [29].
Likewise, as anticipated above, there are several ways of how
to determine when a strategy transfer ought to occur, yet for
lattices the Fermi function can be considered standard as it can
easily recover both the deterministic as well as the stochas-
tic limit. The average fraction of cooperators ρC and defec-
tors ρD in the population must be determined in the stationary
state. Depending on the actual conditions, such as the prox-
imity to extinction points and the typical size of the emerg-
ing spatial patterns, the linear system size has to be between
L = 200 and 1600 in order to avoid accidental extinction,
and the relaxation time has to exceed anywhere between 104
and 106 MCS to ensure the stationary state is reached. Excep-
tions to this basic requirements are not uncommon, especially
when considering more than two competing strategies, as we
will emphasise at the end of this section.
2.1. Group versus pairwise interactions
For games governed by pairwise interactions, such as the
prisoner’s dilemma game, the dependence of the critical temp-
tation to defect bc onK is determined by the presence of over-
lapping triangles. Notably, here bc is the temptation to defect
b above which cooperators are unable to survive (see also Ta-
ble I). If an interaction network lacks overlapping triangles,
and accordingly has the clustering coefficient C = 0, as is the
case for the square and the honeycomb lattice, then there ex-
ists an intermediate K at which bc is maximal. On the other
hand, if overlapping triangles percolate, as is the case for the
triangular and the kagome´ lattice (see Fig. 2), then the de-
terministic limit K → 0 is optimal for the evolution of co-
operation [30, 31]. The spatial public goods game behaves
differently, highlighting that group interactions are more than
just the sum of the corresponding number of pairwise interac-
tions. As demonstrated in [20], group interactions introduce
effective links between players that are not directly connected
by means of the interaction network. Topological differences
between lattices therefore become void, and the deterministic
limit K → 0 becomes optimal for the evolution of cooper-
ation regardless of the type of the interaction network. Re-
sults for pairwise and group interactions are summarised in
Fig. 3. This implies that by group interactions the uncertainty
by strategy adoptions plays at most a side role, as it does not
influence the outcome of the evolutionary process in a quali-
tative way.
The fact that membership in the same groups effectively
connects players that are not linked by means of direct pair-
wise links naturally brings forth the group size as a key system
parameter. In [32] it was shown that increasing the group size
does not necessarily lead to mean-field behavior, as is tradi-
tionally observed for games governed by pairwise interactions
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FIG. 3: Borders between the mixed C + D and the pure D phase
in dependence on the normalized uncertainty by strategy adoptions
K/G, as obtained on different lattices for pairwise (a) and group
(b) interactions. Vertical axis depicts the defection temptation rate,
i.e., the higher its value the smaller the value of r that still allows
the survival of at least some cooperators. By pairwise interactions
(G = 2), the absence of overlapping triangles is crucial (square and
honeycomb lattice), as then there exists and intermediate value of
K at which the evolution of cooperation is optimally promoted. If
triangles do percolate (triangular lattice), the K → 0 limit is op-
timal. This behavior is characteristic for all social dilemmas that
are based on pairwise games, most famous examples being the pris-
oner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game (see Fig. 3 and 5 in [30]).
Conversely, when group interactions are considered (see Fig. 2 for G
values) the topological differences between the lattices become void.
Accordingly, the deterministic K → 0 limit is optimal regardless of
the topology of the host lattice [20].
[33], but rather that public cooperation may be additionally
promoted by means of enhanced spatial reciprocity that sets
in for very large groups where individuals have the opportu-
nity to collect payoffs separately from their direct opponents.
However, very large groups also offer very large benefits to
invading defectors, especially if they are rare, and it is this
back door that limits the success of large groups to sustain
cooperation and puts a lid on the pure number-in-the-group
effect [34]. Figure 4 features two characteristic snapshots and
further details to that effect. It is also worth emphasising that
the joint membership in large groups will indirectly link vast
numbers of players, thus rendering local as well global struc-
tural properties of interaction networks practically irrelevant
FIG. 4: Characteristic snapshot of evolutionary process for small (up,
G = 5) and large (down, G = 301) groups. Cooperators are de-
picted blue while defectors are depicted red. For small groups, the
evolution of strategies proceeds with the characteristic propagation
of the fronts of the more successful strategy (in this case D) until
eventually the maladaptive strategy C goes extinct. For large groups,
however, the cooperative clusters are strong and can outperform the
defectors, even if r is very small. Still, as the density of defectors
decreases, their payoff suddenly becomes very competitive, and thus
they can invade the seemingly invincible cooperative clusters. Such
an alternating time evolution is completely atypical and was previ-
ously associated with cooperators only.
for the final outcome of the public goods game.
2.2. Heterogeneities in the dynamics
Group interactions on structured populations are thus dif-
ferent from the corresponding sum of pairwise interactions.
Consequently not just the group size, but also the distribution
of payoff within the groups becomes important. As shown
in [35, 36], heterogeneous payoff distributions do promote
the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game, yet
unlike as games governed by pairwise interactions [37], uni-
form distributions outperform the more heterogeneous expo-
nential and power law distributions. The setup may also be
reversed in that not the payoffs but rather the contributions to
the groups are heterogeneous. In [38, 39] it was shown that
correlating the contributions with the level of cooperation in
each group markedly promotes prosocial behavior, although
the mechanism may fail to deliver the same results on com-
plex interaction networks where the size of groups is not uni-
form. Conceptually similar studies with likewise similar con-
clusions are also [40–42], although they rely on differences in
the degree of each player to determine payoff allocation. The
latter will be reviewed in Sec. 3 where the focus is on pub-
lic goods games that are staged on complex networks. An-
other possibility to introduce heterogeneity to the spatial pub-
lic goods game is by means of different teaching activities of
players, as was done in [43]. In this case, however, the results
are similar to those reported previously for games governed by
pairwise interactions [44], in that there exists an optimal inter-
mediate density of highly active players at which cooperation
thrives best.
Aside from heterogeneous distributions of payoffs and ini-
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FIG. 5: Different realizations of the public benefit function B(S) =
1
1+exp[−β(Si−T )]
, where T represents the threshold value and β the
steepness of the function [45]. For β = 0 the benefit function is
a constant equalling 0.5, in which case the produced public goods
are insensitive to the efforts of group members. Conversely, for
β = +∞ the benefit function becomes step-like so that group mem-
bers can enjoy the benefits of collaborative efforts via r only if the
total amount of contributions in the group S exceeds a threshold.
Otherwise, they obtain nothing. The depicted curves were obtained
for T = 2.5 and β = 0.1 (dotted red), 1 (dashed green) and 10 (solid
blue).
tial investments, group interactions are also amenable to dif-
ferent public benefit functions, as demonstrated in Fig. 5.
While traditionally it is assumed that the production of pub-
lic goods is linearly dependent on the number of cooperators
within each group, it is also possible to use more complex
benefit functions. The idea has been explored already in well-
mixed populations [15, 45, 47, 48], and in structured popu-
lations the possibilities are more. One is to introduce a criti-
cal mass of cooperators that have to be present in a group in
order for the collective benefits of group membership to be
harvested [46]. If the critical mass is not reached, the initial
contributions can either go to waste, or they can also be depre-
ciated by applying a smaller multiplication factor in that par-
ticular group [49, 50]. Although such models inevitably intro-
duce heterogeneity in the distribution of payoffs [51], they can
also lead to interesting insights that go beyond ad hoc intro-
duced heterogeneity. In [46], for example, it was shown that a
moderate fraction of cooperators can prevail even at very low
multiplication factors if the critical mass M is minimal. For
larger multiplication factors, however, the level of cooperation
was found to be the highest at an intermediate value of M .
Figure 6 features two characteristic scenarios. Notably, the
usage of nonlinear benefit functions is unique to group inter-
actions, and in general it works in favor of public cooperation
[49, 50].
2.3. Strategic complexity
Besides heterogeneity in payoffs and nonlinearity in public
benefit functions, introducing strategic complexity is another
way of bringing the public goods game closer to reality. As
noted above, the willingness to cooperate may depend on the
FIG. 6: Time evolution of strategies on a square lattice having
G = 25, for the critical mass M = 2 (up) and M = 17 (down) at
r/G = 0.6 [46]. Defectors are marked red, while cooperators are de-
picted blue if their initial contributions are exalted or white if they go
to waste. Accordingly, cooperators can be designated as being either
“active” or “inactive”. When M is low all cooperators are active, yet
they don’t have a strong incentive to aggregate because an increase
in their density will not elevate their fitness. Hence, only a moderate
fraction of cooperators coexists with the prevailing defectors in the
stationary state. If the critical mass is neither small nor large, the
status of cooperators varies depending on their location on the lat-
tice: there are places where their local density exceeds the threshold
and they can prevail against defectors. There are also places where
the cooperators are inactive because their density is locally insuffi-
cient and loose against defectors. The surviving domains of active
cooperators start spreading, ultimately rising to near dominance.
behavior of others in the group. Correlating the contributions
with either the level of cooperation in each group [38, 39] or
the degree of players [40–42] can thus be seen not just as het-
erogeneous contributing, but also as conditional cooperation
[52]. An explicit form of this was studied in [53], where con-
ditional cooperator of the type Cj only cooperate provided
there are at least j other cooperators in the group. It was
shown that such strategies are the undisputed victors of the
evolutionary process, even at very low synergy factors. Snap-
shots of the spatial grid reveal the spontaneous emergence of
convex isolated “bubbles” of defectors that are contained by
inactive conditional cooperators. While the latter will pre-
dominantly cooperate with the bulk of active conditional co-
operators, they will certainly defect in the opposite direction,
where there are defectors. Consequently, defectors cannot ex-
ploit conditional cooperators, which leads to a gradual but
unavoidable shrinkage of the defector quarantines. Notably,
conditional strategies introduced in this way have no impact
on the mixed state in unstructured populations and are thus of
interest only on structured populations.
Apart from conditional strategies, the impact of loners,
sometimes referred to as volunteers, has also been studied
in the realm of the spatial public goods game [57]. While
in well-mixed populations volunteering leads to cyclic domi-
nance between the three competing strategies [58, 59], on lat-
tices the complexity of the emerging spatial patterns enables
the observation of phase transitions between one-, two-, and
three-strategy states [57], which fall either in the directed per-
colation universality class [60] or show interesting analogies
7FIG. 7: Indirect territorial battle between pure cooperators (blue) and
peer-punishers (green) (upper row), and between pure cooperators
(blue) and rewarding cooperators (light gray) (lower row). In the up-
per row pure cooperators and peer-punishers form isolated clusters
that compete against defectors (red) for space on the square lattice.
Since peer-punishers are more successful in competing against de-
fectors than pure cooperators (also frequently referred to as second-
order free-riders [54]), eventually the latter die out to a leave a mixed
two-strategy phase (peer-punishers and defectors) as a stationary
state (see [55] for further details). In the lower row defectors are
quick to claim supremacy on the lattice, yet pure and rewarding co-
operators both form isolated compact clusters to try and prevent this.
While rewarding cooperators can outperform defectors, pure coop-
erators can not. Accordingly, the latter die out, leaving qualitatively
the same outcome as depicted in the upper row (see [56] for further
details).
to Ising-type models [61].
The complexity of solutions in spatial public goods games
with three or more competing strategies is indeed fascinat-
ing, which can be corroborated further by results reported
recently for peer-punishment, [55, 62, 63], pool-punishment
[64, 65], the competition between both [66], and for reward
[56]. In general, the complexity is largely due to the spon-
taneous emergence of cycling dominance between the com-
peting strategies, which can manifest in strikingly different
ways. By pool-punishment, for example, if the value of r is
within an appropriate range [64], the pool-punishers can out-
perform defectors who in turn outperform cooperators who in
turn outperform the pool-punishers, thus closing the loop of
dominance. Interestingly, in the absence of defectors peer-
punishers and pure cooperators receive the same payoff, and
hence their evolution becomes equivalent to that of the voter
model [61]. Notably however, the logarithmically slow coars-
ening can be effectively accelerated by adding defectors via
rare random mutations [63]. Similarly complex solutions can
be observed for rewarding [56]. There, if rewards are too
high, defectors can survive by means of cyclic dominance,
but in special parameter regions rewarding cooperators can
prevail over cooperators through an indirect territorial bat-
tle with defectors, qualitatively identically as reported for
peer-punishment [55]. Figure 7 features two sequences of
snapshots that demonstrate both evolutionary scenarios. Al-
together, these results indicate that second-order free-riding
[54, 67, 68], referring to cooperators who refrain either from
punishing or rewarding, finds a natural solution on structured
populations that is due to pattern formation. The aptness of
structured populations for explaining the stability and effec-
tiveness of punishment can in fact be upgraded further by
means of coevolution [69], as we will review in Sec. 4. On the
contrary, while experiments attest to the effectiveness of both
punishment [70] and reward [71] for elevating collaborative
efforts, the stability of such actions in well-mixed populations
is rather elusive, as reviewed comprehensively in [72].
2.4. Statistical physics: avoiding pitfalls
Before concluding this section and devoting our attention to
more complex interaction networks and coevolutionary mod-
els, it is important to emphasize difficulties and pitfalls that are
frequently associated with simulations of three or more com-
peting, possibly cyclically dominating, strategies on struc-
tured populations. Here methods of statistical physics, in par-
ticular that of Monte Carlo simulations [61, 73, 74], are in-
valuable for a correct treatment. Foremost, it is important to
choose a sufficiently large system size and to use long enough
relaxation times. If these conditions are not met the simu-
lations can yield incorrect one- and/or two-strategy solutions
that are unstable against the introduction of a group of mu-
tants. For example, the homogeneous phase of cooperators or
pool-punishers can be invaded completely by the offspring of
a single defector inserted into the system at sufficiently low
values of r [64]. At the same time, defectors can be invaded
by a single group of pool-punishers (or cooperators) if ini-
tially they form a sufficiently large compact cluster. In such
cases the competition between two homogeneous phases can
be characterised by the average velocity of the invasion fronts
separating the two spatial solutions. Note that a system with
three (or more) strategies has a large number of possible solu-
tions because all the solutions of each subsystem (comprising
only a subset of all the original strategies) are also solutions
of the whole system [24]. In such situations the most sta-
ble solution can be deduced by performing a systematic check
of stability between all the possible pairs of subsystem so-
lutions that are separated by an interface in the spatial sys-
tem. Fortunately, this analysis can be performed simultane-
ously if one chooses a suitable patchy structure of subsystem
solutions where all relevant interfaces are present. The whole
grid is then divided into several domains with different initial
strategy distributions containing one, two or three strategies.
Moreover, the strategy adoptions across the interfaces are ini-
tially forbidden for a sufficiently long initialisation period. By
using this approach one can avoid the difficulties associated
either with the fast transients from a random initial state or
with the different time scales that characterize the formation
of possible subsystem solutions. It is easy to see that a random
initial state may not necessarily offer equal chances for every
solution to emerge. Only if the system size is large enough
the solutions can form locally, and the most stable one can
subsequently invade the whole system. At small system sizes,
however, only those solutions whose characteristic formation
times are short enough can evolve. The seminal works consid-
ering punishment on structured populations [75, 76], as well
8FIG. 8: When the public goods game is staged on a complex net-
work, cooperators can either bare a fixed cost per game z (left panel),
or this cost can be normalized with the number of interactions, i.e.,
z/(ki + 1), where ki is the number of neighbors of each particular
cooperator i. In the latter case, one effectively recovers a fixed cost
per individual (right panel). This distinction has significant conse-
quences for the evolution of public cooperation on complex inter-
action networks, as originally reported in [81]. Only if the cost is
normalized with the number of neighbors does social heterogeneity
significantly promote the evolution of public cooperation.
as a most recently anti-social punishment [77], could poten-
tially benefit from such an approach, as it could reveal addi-
tional stable solutions beyond the well-mixed approximation
[58, 78–80].
3. COMPLEX NETWORKS
With the maturity of methods of statistical physics, the
availability of vast amounts of digitised data, and the com-
putational capabilities to process them efficiently, it has be-
come possible to determine the actual contact patterns across
various socio-technical networks [82–84]. These studies have
shown that the degree distribution P (k) of most real-world
networks is highly skewed, and that most of the time it fol-
lows a power law P (k) ∼ k−γ [85]. The heterogeneity of
degrees leads to social diversity, which has important con-
sequences for the evolution of cooperation. Although many
seminal works concerning evolutionary games on networks
have focused on pairwise interactions [24, 25], games gov-
erned by group interactions are rapidly gaining on popularity.
3.1. Social heterogeneity
Due to the overwhelming evidence indicating that social
heterogeneity promotes the evolution of cooperation in pair-
wise social dilemma games [86–90], it is natural to ask what
is its impact on games governed by group interactions. Santos
et al. [81] have therefore reformulated the public goods game
to be staged on complex networks. Every player i plays ki+1
public goods games, as described before for lattices, only that
here the degree ki of every player can be very different. Since
the groups will thus also have different size, cooperators can
contribute either a fixed amount per game ci = z, or a fixed
amount per member of the group ci = z/(ki+1), as depicted
in Fig. 8. Identical to the traditional setup, the contributions
within different groups are multiplied by r and accumulated.
However, the payoff of an otherwise identical player is not the
same for the two different options. By defining the adjacency
matrix of the network as Aij = 1 when individuals i and j are
connected andAij = 0 otherwise, we obtain the following net
benefit Pi for both versions of the game
Pi =
N∑
j=1
Aij
r(
∑N
l=1 Ajlslcl + sjcj)
kj + 1
+
r(
∑N
j=1Aijsjcj + sici)
ki + 1
− (ki + 1)sici , (4)
where however the precise value of ci is set depending on
whether cooperators bare a fixed cost per game or a fixed cost
per player. After each full round of the game all players decide
synchronously whether or not they will change their strategy.
This is done by following the finite population analogue of
the replicator rule. An individual i with payoff Pi randomly
selects one neighbor j amongst its ki contacts. If Pi ≥ Pj
nothing changes, but if Pi < Pj player i adopts the strategy
of the more successful neighbor j with a probability that de-
pends on the difference ∆P = Pj − Pi.
Results presented in [81] show that heterogeneous networks
promote the evolution of public cooperation. Yet this is partic-
ularly true when cooperators pay a fixed cost per individual.
Cooperation is then viable already at η = r/(〈k〉 + 1) = 0.3
(normalized multiplication factor), which is less than half of
the critical value obtained on lattices. Moreover, heteroge-
neous networks enable complete cooperator dominance well
before cooperative behavior even emerges on regular net-
works. Phenomenologically, the promotion of cooperation is
due to the diversity of investments, which is a direct conse-
quence of the heterogeneity of the underlying network. As
cooperators pay a cost that depends on their degree, namely
c/(k + 1), the fitness landscape becomes very rich and di-
verse – a feature absent for lattices. In fact, for a single public
goods game the difference between the payoff of a cooper-
ator and defector is no longer proportional to c, but rather
inversely proportional to the number of games each player
plays. This gives and evolutionary advantage to cooperative
hubs, i.e., players with a high degree.
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ers to study the evolution of public cooperation on complex
networks. As evidenced by preceding works considering pair-
wise social dilemmas, the degree distribution is not the only
property that affects the outcome of an evolutionary process
[91–95]. Other properties, like the average path length, the
clustering coefficient, or the presence of correlations amongst
high-degree nodes can be just as important [24]. Rong and Wu
[96] have explored how the presence of degree correlations
affects the evolution of public cooperation on scale-free net-
works. They found that assortative networks – those in which
alike nodes are likely connected to each other – act detrimental
as heterogeneity no longer confers a natural advantage to co-
operative hubs. Conversely, if players with dissimilar degree
are more likely connected, the onset of cooperation occurs at
lower values of r. Similarly, Rong et al. [97] have investigated
the evolution of public cooperation on highly clustered hetero-
geneous networks, discovering that clustering has a beneficial
effect on the evolution of cooperation as it favors the forma-
tion and stability of compact cooperative clusters. Yang et
al. [98], on the other hand, adopted a different approach by
trying to optimise the number of cooperative individuals on
uncorrelated heterogeneous networks. They have considered
a variation of the original model [81], in which potential strat-
egy donors are no longer chosen randomly but rather propor-
tionally to their degree. It was shown that the promotion of
cooperation is optimal if the selection of neighbors is linearly
proportional to their degree. While these results indicate that
correlations are very important for the evolution of public co-
operation, further explorations are needed to fully understand
all the details of results presented in [96–98], which we have
here omitted.
We end this subsection by revisiting the role of hetero-
geneities in the dynamics of investments and payoff distribu-
tions, as reviewed before in subsection 2.2. Unlike lattices,
complex networks make it interesting to correlate the degree
of players with either (i) the investments they make as coop-
erators [40, 99], (ii) the payoffs they are receiving from each
group [41, 100], or with (iii) both (i) and (ii) together [42].
These studies exploit the heterogeneity of scale-free networks
to implement degree-based policies aimed at promoting coop-
eration. In [40], for example, it has been shown that positively
correlating the contributions of cooperators with their degree
acts strongly detrimental on the evolution of public coopera-
tion. On the other hand, if cooperators with only a few con-
nections are those contributing the most, cooperation is pro-
moted. An opposite relation has been established with respect
to the correlations between the degree of players and the allo-
cation of payoffs [41, 100]. In particular, cooperation thrives
if players with the highest degree receive the biggest share of
the payoff within each group. Moreover, the impact of degree-
correlated aspiration levels has also been studied [101], and it
was shown that a positive correlation, such that the larger the
degree of a player the higher its aspiration level, promotes co-
operation. Together, these results indicate that favoring hubs
by either decreasing their investments or increasing their pay-
offs or aspiration promotes the evolution of public coopera-
tion, which in turn strengthens the importance of hubs as de-
clared already in the seminal paper by Santos et al. [81].
3.2. Accounting for group structure: bipartite graphs
The implementation of the public goods game as introduced
in [81] makes an important assumption regarding the compo-
sition of groups in which the games take place. This assump-
tion relies on the fact that each group is defined solely on the
basis of connections making up the complex interaction net-
work. However, it is rather unrealistic that this definition holds
in real social networks, such as for example collaboration net-
works [103]. Figure 9 features a schematic presentation of this
situation. Suppose we know the actual interaction structure of
a system composed of 6 individuals performing collaborative
tasks arranged into 4 groups (central panel). If we merge this
structure into a projected (one-mode) complex network, the
collection of groups is transformed into a star-like graph (left
panel) having a central hub (node 6) with five neighbors. By
making this coarse-graining, we have lost all the information
about the group structure of the system, and it is easy to realise
that following [81] to construct the groups we recover a very
different composition made up of 6 groups of sizes 6, 4 (2), 3
(2) and 2, respectively. Moreover, it is important to note that
a scale-free distribution of interactions P (k) ∼ k−γ maps di-
rectly to a scale-free distribution of group sizes P (g) ∼ g−γ .
However, in reality individuals tend to perform collaborative
tasks in groups of a rather homogeneous size [104], regardless
of the size of the set of their overall collaborators. Accord-
ingly, the distribution of group size is better described by an
exponential distribution P (g) ∼ exp(−αg).
To preserve information about both the structure of pairwise
ties and the structure of groups, Go´mez-Garden˜es et al. have
introduced the use of bipartite graphs [102, 105]. A bipartite
representation, as depicted in the right panel of Fig. 9, con-
tains two types of nodes. One denoting individuals (circular
nodes), and the other denoting groups (square nodes), whereas
links connect them as appropriate. Such a bipartite framework
is well-suited for studying dynamical processes involving N -
player interactions.
The setup of the public goods game on bipartite networks
is similar to that on one-mode networks, with deviations as
described in [102, 105]. The graph is composed of N agents
playing the game withinG (not necessarily equal toN ) groups
whose connections are encoded in a G×N matrixBij . The i-
th row of this matrix accounts for all the individuals belonging
to group i, so that Bij = 1 when agent j participates in group
i while Bij = 0 otherwise. Alternatively, the information in
the i-th column encodes all the groups containing agent i, i.e.,
Bji = 1 when agent i participates in group j and Bji = 0
otherwise. At each time step player i plays a round of the
game in every group it is member. The total payoff after being
involved in qi =
∑G
j=1 Bji groups can be expressed as
Pi =
G∑
j=1
rBji
mj
[
N∑
l=1
Bjlslcl
]
− siciqi , (5)
where mj =
∑N
i=1Bji is the number of individuals in group
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FIG. 9: Schematic presentation of the two different forms of encoding collaboration data. In the central plot several collaborating groups
represent the original data. The interactions amongst players can be translated into a projected complex network (left). However, if one aims
at preserving all the information about the group structure, a representation as a bipartite graph (right) is more appropriate. Figure reproduced
with permission from [102].
j. Although in principle one could take further advantage of
the group structure in order to define different scenarios for
the update of strategies, the evolutionary dynamics is defined
identically as on one-mode projected networks [102, 105].
The updating can rely on the usage of a replicator-like rule
[81], or the Fermi rule introduced in Eq. 3.
Results presented in [102] indicate that, regardless of the
update rule and the details of the public goods game, the actual
group structure of collaboration networks promotes the evolu-
tion of cooperation. One arrives to this conclusion by com-
paring the cooperation level on the bipartite representation of
a real collaboration network (containing author-article links)
with the cooperation level on a projected one-mode network
that is composed solely of author-author ties (see Fig. 10). On
the other hand, by comparing the performance of two bipartite
structures having different social connectivity – one having
scale-free and the other a Poissonian distribution of degree –
but the same group structure [105], we find that it is the group
structure rather than the distribution of degree that determines
the evolution of public cooperation. In particular, the promo-
tion of cooperation due to a scale-free distribution of degree
as reported in [81] is hindered when the group structure is dis-
entangled from the social network of contacts by means of the
bipartite formulation.
Notably, the bipartite formulation has recently been revis-
ited by Pen˜a and Rochat [106], who compared the impact of
different distributions used separately for group sizes and the
number of individual contacts. They showed that a key fac-
tor that drives cooperation on bipartite networks is the degree
of overlap between the groups. The later can be interpreted
as the bipartite analogue of the clustering coefficient in one-
mode networks, which as reviewed above, is highly beneficial
for the evolution of public cooperation. The results reported
in [106] also help to understand the high level of coopera-
tion observed in one-mode scale-free networks [81], because
the assumption that the structure of groups is implicitly de-
fined by the network itself imposes a high degree of overlap
between the groups, especially for scale-free networks.
3.3. Other network-based frameworks
In addition to the distributions of individual contacts and
group sizes, the impact of other topological features of social
networks has also been studied. In particular, in [107] the au-
thors studied a hierarchical social structure composed of com-
munities or modules in which several public goods games are
played simultaneously. For a setup with 2 hierarchical levels
we thus have the following framework: player i is member in
one group of size m at the lowest level and, simultaneously,
it is also a member in a larger group together with the rest of
the population. This setup can be generalised to systems com-
posed of n hierarchical levels, as shown in the upper panel of
Fig. 11 for n = 3. The coupling between the evolutionary dy-
namics in each of the levels is accomplished by splitting the
contribution c of each cooperator by the number of groups,
and by choosing a different probability for the updating rules
within and between modules. Results reported in [107] indi-
cate that public cooperation is promoted when imitation be-
tween players belonging to different modules is strong, while
at the same time the imitation between players within the same
lowest level module is weak. This combination of strengths
leads to the onset of groups composed solely of cooperators,
but it also enables cooperators that coexist with defectors to
avoid extinction.
Another important structural feature recently addressed is
multiplexity [109–111], or the coupling between several net-
work substrates. Although this structural ingredient has only
recently been tackled in the field of network science, some
works on the subject have already appeared in the context of
evolutionary games [108, 112]. In [108], where the focus was
on group interactions, the authors have studied a simple lay-
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FIG. 10: Cooperation level 〈C〉 as a function of the multiplication
factor r for the public goods game played on the one-mode (pro-
jected) collaboration network and the bipartite graph preserving the
original group structure. The two plots are for the public goods game
played in the fixed cost per game (FCG) and the fixed cost per indi-
vidual (FCI) mode. The strategy updating makes use of the Fermi
function (see Eq. 3). This figure is reproduced with permission from
[102].
ered framework in which two regular lattices were coupled as
depicted schematically in the bottom panel of Fig. 11. The ra-
tionale is that a given individual is represented in each of the
two layers, although in principle, it can adopt different strate-
gies in each of them. The coupling between layers is solely
due to the utility function, which couples the payoff PAi ob-
tained on layer A and the payoff PBj obtained on layer B as
Ui = αP
A
i + (1 − α)P
B
i , Uj = (1 − α)P
B
j + αP
A
i . (6)
The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] determines the bias in each layer.
When α → 0 (α → 1) the dynamics of layer A (B) is almost
fully driven by layer B (A). An intriguing result reported in
[108] is that as one layer almost dominates the other, cooper-
ation is very much favored in the slave layer, i.e., in A when
α → 0 or in B when α → 1. Obviously, the master layer
then behaves almost equally as an isolated graph, showing a
greater vulnerability to defection than the slave layer. These
initial results invite further research concerning the impact of
multiplexity of social networks on the evolution of coopera-
tion.
FIG. 11: The upper panel shows the multilevel hierarchical struc-
ture introduced in [107], where groups are hierarchically ordered as
modules of a network in which the public goods game is played. This
figure is reproduced with permission from [107]. The bottom panel
shows two interdependent lattices as studied in [108]. Players can
adopt different strategies within each layer, but coupling between the
payoffs obtained in each of the two layers (see Eq. 6) makes their
evolutionary dynamics interdependent.
3.4. Populations of mobile agents
Prior to focusing on coevolutionary rules, we review one
special case in which a population of mobile players is em-
bedded in a physical space so that a time-varying network
of interactions is constructed sequentially and in accordance
with their movements. Two possible scenarios must be dis-
tinguished. First, there are studies in which the movement
of players is independent of the evolutionary dynamics [113–
116]. Effectively, the movements thus correspond to a random
walk. Second, the motion of players can be affected by the
outcome of the game [117–123]. In addition to this classifica-
tion, we must also distinguish two different types of space in
which the players live. In particular, players can either move
on a lattice, or they can move across continuous space. In
the former case, the network of interactions is set simply by
considering two players occupying two adjacent sites as con-
nected, so that the resulting graph is a square lattice with a
certain fraction of missing links [124]. The usage of contin-
uous space, on the other hand, requires the construction of a
random geometric graph every time after all the players have
changed their position. Such graphs are typically constructed
by connecting together all pairs of players that are less apart
than a given threshold R. This introduces an additional pa-
rameter that allows an interpolation between a fully uncon-
nected (R = 0) and a fully connected (R→∞) graph.
An interesting study where the movements were uncorre-
lated with the evolutionary dynamics was performed by [116].
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The players moved randomly with a constant velocity v in a
continuous 2-dimensional plane, establishing a random ge-
ometric graph with constant radius R after all agents have
made a move. The groups in which the public goods game
was played where then constructed as introduced in [81]. Two
resonance-like phenomena were reported, given that the frac-
tion of cooperators exhibited a bell-shaped dependence on
both v and R. Accordingly, an intermediate degree of mobil-
ity, as well as an intermediate level of connectedness amongst
the mobile players were found to be optimal for the evolu-
tion of cooperation. The maximum was found to be closely
related to the percolation threshold of a random geometric
graph, much in agreement with preceding results on static net-
works [125].
The setup where the mobility was driven by the evolution-
ary dynamics was explored more often, especially for games
governed by pairwise interaction. Factors that can affect how
and when the players move include their fitness [117, 118], as-
piration level [119, 120], as well as reputation [122]. In terms
of group interactions, Roca et al. [121] considered a system
of N agents occupying a L × L > N square lattice. The
players were allowed to move to an empty site if their aspi-
rations were not met. They have showed that only moderate
greediness leads to high levels of public cooperation and so-
cial agglomeration. A similar model was studied by Xia et
al. [123], who showed that the provisioning of local informa-
tion about the payoffs of nearest neighbors does not alter the
original conclusions presented in [121].
We conclude this subsection by noting that payoff-driven
mobility has also been explored in the framework of metapop-
ulations [126]. There a population of N players moves across
a network of M nodes, where M > N . Thus, when several
players meet on the same node of the network, they play a
round of the public goods game. Subsequently, based on the
difference between the collected payoff and their aspiration
level, they decide whether to stay or to move to a neighbor-
ing node. An interesting result reported in [126] is that the
larger the ratio M/N , and hence the larger the average size of
groups in which the game is played, the better the chances of
cooperators to survive.
4. COEVOLUTIONARY RULES
Coevolutionary models go beyond structured populations
in the sense that the interaction network itself may be sub-
ject to evolution [127–130]. However, this need not always be
the case, as the coevolutionary process can also affect system
properties other than the interaction network, like for exam-
ple the group size [131], heritability [132], the selection of
opponents [133], the allocation of investments [134], the dis-
tribution of public goods [135], or the punishment activity of
individual players [69]. Possibilities seem endless, as recently
reviewed for games governed by pairwise interactions [136].
Games governed by group interactions have received compar-
atively little attention.
One of the earliest coevolutionary rules affecting the inter-
action network during a public goods game was proposed and
FIG. 12: Coevolution of strategy and structure leads to high levels of
public cooperation. Networks depict snapshots in time at 0 (a), 2000
(b) and 20000 (c) iterations, whereby green links connect defector-
cooperator pairs, blue links connect two defectors, while red links
connect two cooperators. Accordingly, cooperators are depicted red
and defectors are depicted blue. This figure was reproduced with
permission from [127], where also further details with respect to the
simulation setup can be found.
studied by Wu et al. [127], where it was shown that adjusting
the social ties based on the payoffs of players may signifi-
cantly promote cooperation. If given an opportunity to avoid
predominantly defective groups (referred to as a “nasty envi-
ronment”), the population can arrive at a globally cooperative
state even for low values of r. Interestingly, decoupling the
coevolutionary adjustment of social ties with the evolution of
strategies renders the proposed rule ineffective in terms of pro-
moting public cooperation. As depicted in Fig. 12, allowing
for the coevolution of strategy and structure leads to predom-
inantly cooperative states out of an initially mixed population
of cooperators and defectors.
Alternative coevolutionary models affecting the interac-
tions amongst players were also studied in [128–130], with the
prevailing conclusion being that the evolution of public coop-
eration can benefit greatly from the interplay between strategy
and structure. In particular, aspiration-induced reconnection
can induce a negative feedback effect that stops the downfall
of cooperators at low values of r and lead to heterogeneous
interaction networks [129], while strategy-inspired additions
and deletions of links between players can lead to hierarchical
clustering [130]. Also worth noting is the first coevolutionary
model making use of the bipartite network formalism [137],
where individuals can switch groups. An implementation of
social policies is thus possible and in [137] it was shown that
restricting the maximum capacity of groups is a good policy
for promoting cooperation.
Another interesting coevolutionary rule is the preferential
selection of opponents introduced in [133]. It was shown
that a simple payoff-based selection can lead to higher pay-
offs along the boundaries separating cooperators and defec-
tors, which in turn facilitates spatial reciprocity and leads to
larger cooperative clusters. Likewise leaving the interactions
amongst players unchanged is the dynamic allocation of in-
vestments [134] and the success-driven distribution of public
goods studied in [135]. Both frameworks have the ability to
promote cooperation, although in the latter case the complete
dominance of cooperators may be elusive due to the sponta-
neous emergence of super-persistent defectors. This in turn
indicates that success-driven mechanisms are crucial for ef-
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FIG. 13: Rough interfaces enable defectors (red) an effective ex-
ploitation of cooperators (blue), thus hindering spatial reciprocity.
Upon the introduction of adaptive punishment (green, where darker
(lighter) shades imply stronger (weaker) punishing activity), inter-
faces become smoother, which in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity
and prevents defectors from being able to exploit the public goods.
A prepared initial state, corresponding to a rough interface, is used
to reveal the workings of this mechanism. Interestingly, here the sta-
tionary state is a pureC phase, while under the same conditions peer-
punishment without coevolution yields a pure D phase. We refer to
[69] for further details.
fectively harvesting benefits from collective actions, but that
they may also account for the observed persistence of mal-
adaptive behavior.
Strategic complexity may also be subject to coevolution,
as proposed and studied in [69], where players were allowed
to adapt their sanctioning efforts depending on the failure of
cooperation in groups where they were members. Preceding
models assumed that, once set, the fine and cost of punish-
ment do not change over time [55]. However, by relaxing this
restriction one obtains the spontaneous emergence of punish-
ment so that both defectors and those unwilling to punish them
with globally negligible investments are deterred. Crucial is
the fact that adaptive punishers are able to smooth the inter-
faces between cooperators and defectors, as demonstrated in
Fig. 13. This indicates that coevolution may be the key to un-
derstanding complex social behavior as well as its stability in
the presence of seemingly more cost-efficient strategies.
Before concluding this review, it is important to point out
that diffusion may also be seen as a coevolutionary process
[136], as it allows players to move in the population. In a
series of papers, Wakano et al. [138–140] have elaborated ex-
tensively on the patterns that may arise in two-dimensional
continuous space. A detailed analysis of the spatiotempo-
ral patterns based on the Fourier analysis and Lyapunov ex-
ponents reveals the presence of spatiotemporal chaos [140],
which fits to the complexity of solutions one is likely to en-
counter when studying group interactions on structured popu-
lations.
5. OUTLOOK
Although our understanding of evolutionary processes that
are governed by group interactions has reached a remarkably
high level, there still exist unexplored problems that require
further attention. While physics-inspired studies account for
the majority of recent advances on this topic [24, 25, 136],
there also exist many experimental and theoretical results on
well-mixed populations that would be interesting to verify on
structured populations.
The “stick versus carrot” dilemma [141–143], for example,
is yet to be settled on structured populations. It is also impor-
tant to note that recent research related to antisocial punish-
ment [77, 80, 144, 145] and reward [56, 71, 78, 141, 142]
is questioning the aptness of sanctioning for elevating col-
laborative efforts and raising social welfare. The majority of
previous studies addressing the “stick versus carrot” dilemma
concluded that punishment is more effective than reward in
sustaining public cooperation [72, 146]. However, evidences
point out that rewards may be as effective as punishment and
lead to higher total earnings without potential damage to rep-
utation [147, 148] or fear from retaliation [149]. In view of
recent advances concerning punishment [55, 62–64, 66] and
reward [56] on lattices, it seems worth continuing in this di-
rection also with antisocial punishment and the competition
between punishment and reward in general. There is also the
question of scale at which social dilemmas are best resolved
[150], as well as the issue of the emergence of fairness in
group interactions [151], which could also both be examined
on structured populations.
Complex interactions networks also offer many possibili-
ties for future research on games governed by group interac-
tions. The concept of bipartitness [102, 105], for example,
appears to be related to multilevel selection [107, 152], which
however was so far considered without explicit network struc-
ture describing the interactions amongst players. Motivation
can also be gathered from coevolutionary games [136], where
group interactions on structured populations can still be con-
sidered as being at an early stage of development. While ini-
tially many studies that were performed only for pairwise so-
cial dilemmas appeared to be trivially valid also for games that
are governed by group interactions, recent research has made
it clear that at least by default this is in fact not the case. In
this sense the incentives are clearly there to reexamine the key
findings that were previously reported only for pairwise games
on complex and coevolutionary networks also for games that
are governed by group interactions.
6. SUMMARY
Group interactions on structured populations can be much
more than the sum of the corresponding pairwise interactions.
Strategic complexity, different public benefit functions, and
coevolutionary processes on either lattices or complex net-
works provide a rich playground that can be explored suc-
cessfully with methods of statistical physics [24, 82, 153].
Research performed thus far offers a thorough understanding
of the many key phenomena that can be uniquely associated
with games governed by group interactions. On lattices, group
interactions effectively link players that are members of the
same groups without there being a physical connection be-
tween them. This renders local particularities of interaction
networks largely unimportant for the outcome of the evolu-
tionary process, and it introduces the deterministic limit of
strategy imitation as optimal for the evolution of public coop-
eration [20]. On the other hand, the size of the group [32] as
14
well as public benefit functions [46] gain markedly on signif-
icance, thus offering new possibilities for exploration. Strate-
gic complexity [56, 57, 62, 64, 66] significantly increases the
complexity of solutions due to spatial pattern formation, yet
the obtained results provide elegant explanations for several
long-standing problems in the social sciences. Examples in-
clude the second-order free-rider problem [55], as well as
the stability of reward [56] and the successful evolution of
institutions [64, 66], all of which require additional strate-
gic complexity on well-mixed populations in order to be ex-
plained. Complex networks and coevolutionary models fur-
ther extend the subject with insightful results concerning bi-
partitness [102, 105] and the rewiring of social ties [127, 129],
all adding significantly to our understanding of the provision-
ing of public goods in human societies.
Although the origins of prosocial behavior in groups of un-
related individuals are difficult to trace down – there exist ev-
idence indicating that between-group conflicts may have been
instrumental for enhancing in-group solidarity [154], yet allo-
parental care and provisioning for someone else’s young have
also been proposed as viable for igniting the evolution of our
other-regarding abilities [155] – it is a fact that cooperation in
groups is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of
the human species, and it is therefore of importance to iden-
tify mechanisms that might have spurred its later development
[2, 156]. The aim of this review is to highlight the importance
of such group interactions, and to demonstrate the suitabil-
ity of methods of statistical physics and network science for
studying the evolution of cooperation in games that are gov-
erned by them.
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